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WHAT'S THE "POINT' OF THE CLEAN
WATER ACT FOLLOWING UNITED STATES v.
PLAZA HEALTH LABORATORIES, INC.?:*
THE SECOND CIRCUIT ACTS AS A LEGISLATOR
RATHER THAN AS A COURT
Robin L. Greenwald**
INTRODUCTION
During the summer of 1988, New York headlines chroni-
cled the pollution, if not the destruction, of area beaches. One
such article told of a day of beach closures from the devastat-
ing epidemic of medical waste wash-ups:
It began, unnoticed, on the crystalline morning of Sunday, July
3: Sometime around 10:30, the wind imperceptibly turned, blowing
in from the southwest, targeting the beaches of Long Island.
Three days later, horrified noontime bathers along a six-mile
swath of sandy shoreline from Point Lookout to Long Beach were
wading through slicks of trash, including vials of encrusted blood
and needle-tipped syringes. Amid the hysteria of the blood-borne
AIDS epidemic, the finds set off a rush of closings of seafront parks
along New York's vast underbelly and triggered one of the most
sweeping environmental investigations ever in the region, involving
Federal, state and local authorities.1
The problem was not isolated to the New York metropoli-
tan area, but affected states all along the eastern coastline.'
* 3 F.3d 643 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2764 (1994).
** Assistant United States Attorney, Eastern District of New York. I was one
of the attorneys who prosecuted Plaza Health. I also represented the government
in the Plaza Health case on appeal. As a result of my close involvement in the
case from the outset, the views I have expressed in this Article are as an
advocate as much as an objective reviewer. Moreover, while the United States
Department of Justice approved a petition to request the Second Circuit to rehear
the appeal in banc after the CircuWs decision, and the Office of the Solicitor
General filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme
Court, the positions set forth in this Article are mine and do not express the
opinions of the United States Department of Justice.
' Ralph Blumenthal, Mystery of Fouled Beaches: Clues, But No 'Smoking Gun,"
N.Y. TmEs, July 25, 1988, at Al.
2 One account read:
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Government regulators were heard to say "'I'd hate to be the
individual we could catch."'3 Chief state prosecutors also ex-
pressed outrage that more was not being done to apprehend
and to prosecute those responsible for the wash-ups: "'I am
confident that each of you shares my outrage.... I'm not sim-
ply concerned with the presence of this waste along our coast-
line, but I am appalled that federal law enforcement resources
have not been rallied earlier.., to investigate, apprehend and
prosecute the individuals or corporations responsible."' 4 Re-
sponding to the ever-growing fear that beachgoers would con-
tract a deadly disease from medical waste peppering the beach-
es and that the economies of beach communities would be
devastated by the medical waste wash-ups,5 George Bush, in
his acceptance speech for the 1988 presidential nomination,
called for the prosecution of those responsible for polluting the
nation's waters with medical wastes: "'I am going to have the
FBI trace the medical wastes, and we're going to punish the
people who dump those infected needles into our oceans, lakes
and rivers." 6
On June 3 four vials of blood washed up on Island State Park
Beach in New Jersey. By July, more debris had turned up in Bayonne
on Newark Bay. Over the rest of the summer, a wide array of catheters,
colostomy bags, i.v. bottles, portions of respirators and other hospital
equipment appeared along the coastline in New York, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, Maryland, Rhode Island and Ohio.
Throughout the country, the sudden specter of medical wastes litter-
ing the landscape triggered public fears that a major new health hazard
had slipped through the government controls-bringing with it a risk of
infection from such diseases as hepatitis and AIDS.
Few locations seem immune to the problem. From Cape Cod to
North Carolina, from Long Island Sound to Baltimore Harbor, medical
waste has generated headlines, driven away vacationers, closed public
beaches, prompted hearings in Congress and elicited public outcries from
politicians.
Sally Squires, Needles on the Beach: The Growing Pains of Medical Waste, WASH.
POST, Aug. 23, 1988, at Z12.
' Blumenthal, supra note 1, at Al (quoting William J. Muszynski, deputy re-
gional administrator of the federal Environmental Protection Agency).
" Squires, supra note 2, at Z12 (quoting Rhode Island's then-Attorney General
James E. O'Neil).
' Direct economic costs to New York and New Jersey alone resulting from the
medical waste wash-ups during the summer of 1988 were estimated at $1 billion
to $5.4 billion. James W. Brown, The Medical Waste Outcry: A Personal Update,
MED. LAB. OBSERvER, Apr. 1991, at 40.
' Squires, supra note 2, at Z12.
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Once the persons responsible for dumping medical wastes
in the nation's waters were apprehended, everyone assumed
that existing federal law included the enforcement mechanism
necessary to punish such conduct.7 The Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act8 (commonly known as the "Clean Water Act")
proclaims that the discharge of pollutants into navigable wa-
ters should cease by 1985.' To accomplish this goal, Congress
provided that, in the absence of a permit, the discharge into
the water of any pollutant by any person is unlawful,'0 and, if
the unlawful discharge is made with the requisite mens rea, it
is criminal." In United States v. Plaza Health Laboratories,
Inc.,2 however, the Second Circuit defied existing wisdom and
held that intentional dumping by an individual of medical
waste into our nation's waters is not a crime.
This Article examines the Second Circuit's treatment, in
Plaza Health, of a criminal prosecution and conviction of an
individual under the Clean Water Act for dumping hundreds of
blood vials into the Hudson River during the summer of 1988.
The Article first sets forth the facts underlying the prosecution.
Next, it reviews the provisions of the Clean Water Act relevant
to the Plaza Health indictment, followed by a discussion of the
proceedings before the district court. The Article then reviews
the Second Circuit panel majority and dissenting opinions in
Plaza Health, followed by an analysis of the majority's deci-
sion. Finally, the Article explores the many questions remain-
ing about the viability of civil and criminal Clean Water Act
enfoi-cement following the Second Circuit's treatment of the
law in Plaza Health.
" As Richard B. Stewart, the then-Acting Attorney General for the Environ-
ment and Natural Resources Division of the Department of Justice, said when the
jury returned a verdict of guilty in the Plaza Health trial: "'This case is a sad
reminder that even though criminal environmental prosecutions are on the rise,
there are still individuals in this country who blatantly disregard the law-they
must be punished.'" New Jersey Lab Executive Guilty of Throwing Contaminated
Blood Into New York Waterway, U.S. NEWS~wRE, Feb. 1, 1991.
8 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
' Id. § 1251(a)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
1' Id. § 1311(a).
" Id. § 1319(c) (Supp. V 1993).
12 3 F.3d 643 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct 2764 (1994).
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I. THE PLAZA HEALTH PROSECUTION
A. Facts
The defendant, Geronimo Villegas, was the co-owner and
vice president of Plaza Health Laboratories, Inc. ("Plaza
Health"), a blood testing laboratory located in Brooklyn, New
York.13 On at least two separate occasions, between April and
September 1988, Villegas transported hundreds of blood vials
generated at Plaza Health, some of which contained blood
infected with the hepatitis-B virus, to his condominium com-
plex in Edgewater, New Jersey.'4 As the name suggests,
Edgewater is located on the banks of the Hudson River. Once
at his condominium complex, Villegas took the vials from the
trunk of his car, walked them to the edge of the Hudson River
and dumped them into the water. I"
On May 26, 1988, a teacher at Saint John's Lutheran
School took her eighth-grade class to the Alice Austin House in
Staten Island, New York, for a field trip. During the field trip,
a group of children took a walk along the beach. While on the
beach, the children found blood vials scattered on the beach
and saw other blood vials floating in the water." The children
had the presence of mind to leave the vials where they had
found them and to call to their teacher for help. Employees of
the Alice Austin House reported the finding to the authorities.
Later that day, New York City Environmental Police Offi-
cers arrived at the scene and saw blood vials scattered on the
beach and many more floating in shallow waters. Many of the
vials in the water were breaking as they hit the rocks. The
officers retrieved approximately 70 blood vials from the wa-
ter.17
Nearly four months later, on September 25, 1988, a main-
tenance worker at the Admirals Walk Condominium Associa-
tion, where Villegas lived, discovered a plastic container full of
vials of blood wedged in the rocks forming the bulkhead be-
" Id. at 643.
14 Id. at 643-44.
15 Id. at 644.
6 Id.
" Plaza Health, 3 F.3d at 644.
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tween the condominium complex and the Hudson River.18 He
reported his finding to the New Jersey Police Department.
Over the next two days, investigators found other plastic con-
tainers containing blood vials and hundreds of blood vials
floating in the Hudson River alongside the condominium com-
plex.
Many of the vials retrieved from the Alice Austin House
beach and the area around the condominium locations had
labels affixed to them which bore a numerical code and, in
some instances, a patient's name. Investigators traced all of
the vials to Plaza Health. 9 As to the vials that had washed
ashore in Staten Island, an oceanographer who testified as an
expert witness for the government explained that materials
dumped in the Hudson River at Edgewater, New Jersey, could
readily be carried by the river's tides and currents to the beach
in Staten Island.
Investigators learned that Villegas lived at the Admirals
Walk Condominium at the time of the dumpings. When inves-
tigators questioned Villegas, he admitted to one incident of
dumping vials in the bulkhead adjacent to his condominium in
June 1988, as well as to dumping blood vials in a garbage can
beside a tennis court in Edgewater."
B. Relevant Clean Water Act Provisions
Section 1311(a) of the Clean Water Act provides that,
"[elxcept as in compliance with this section and section[ ] ...
1342... of this title, the discharge of any pollutant by any
person shall be unlawful."2 Section 1342 sets forth the re-
quirements for obtaining permits for the discharge of pollut-
ants.22 The criminal penalties provision of the Clean Water
Act are contained in section 1319(c), which provides, in rele-
vant part, that
Any person who -
(A) knowingly violates section 1311... of this title,
18 Id.
1 Id.
20 Joint Appendix [hereinafter "JA7] at 33. The Joint Appendix can be found in
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals' file for the Plaza Health appeal.
21 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
Id. § 1342 (Supp. V 1993).
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shall be punished by a fine of not less than $5,000 nor more than
$50,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment for not more than 3
years, or by both.'
Thus, reading sections 1311, 1319(c) and 1342 together, the
Clean Water Act makes it a crime for any person knowingly to
discharge a pollutant into the waters of the United States
unless the discharge is in accordance with a lawfully issued
permit.
The term "discharge of a pollutant" is defined as "any
addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point
source." 4 Included in the term "pollutant" is "solid waste,...
garbage,... biological materials.., and industrial, municipal,
and agricultural waste discharged into water."' Finally, the
term "point source," the term that ultimately was at issue in
Plaza Health, is defined as follows:
any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not
limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete
fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding opera-
tion, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or
may be discharged. This term does not include agricultural
stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated agricul-
ture.
,26
C. The District Court Proceedings
On May 16, 1989, a grand jury sitting in the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York indicted Plaza Health and Villegas on two
counts of violating the Clean Water Act relating to the vials
discovered on the Staten Island beach. In a superseding indict-
ment, the grand jury charged Villegas and his company 7 with
two additional counts relating to the vials found in Edgewater,
New Jersey." Each of the four counts of the indictment re-
33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
24 Id. § 1362(12).
25 Id. § 1362(6).
26 Id. § 1362(14) (emphasis added).
2 Following the indictment, but before the trial, Plaza Health filed for bank-
ruptcy pursuant to Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. The trial, accordingly, pro-
ceeded against Villegas only. Plaza Health, 3 F.3d at 644.
" Each of the dumping incidents had one count for knowingly discharging
pollutants into the water (the "knowing discharge" counts), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2),
and a separate count for knowing endangerment under the Clean Water Act (the
[Vol. 60: 689
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quired the government to prove that the defendant discharged
the pollutants from a "point source." In this case, Villegas
threw the vials into the water with his hands; thus, the last
"point" of contact with the pollutant before it entered the water
was the defendant's hand." The evidence introduced at trial
relating to the means by which the vials entered the water was
principally Villegas's own statement given to investigators in
October 1988. In the statement, Villegas explained that he
went to the bulkhead with the containers of blood vials and, at
low tide, wedged the containers between rocks of the bulk-
head.3" That admission, coupled with identifying labels which
"knowing endangerment" counts). Id. § 1319(c)(3). Pursuant to the knowing endan-
germent provision, a person who knowingly dumps pollutants into the water with-
out a permit, knowing at the time that such activity places another person in
imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury, is subject to a term of impris-
onment of 15 years and a fine of $250,000. Id. Because some of the vials from
both dumpings contained blood infected with hepatitis-B, a highly contagious and
potentially deadly virus, Villegas was charged with knowing endangerment as well.
29 It is this last link-the human touch-in the chain of events leading up to
the vials washing ashore that led the Second Circuit to conclude that Villegas did
not violate the Clean Water Act when he dumped vials from his blood testing
laboratory into the Hudson River. See infra text accompanying notes 42-51.
V' illegas described his actions as follows:
Q: When was the next incident [following the June 1988 blood vial
dumping in a garbage can at the Binghamton Racquet Club]?
A: Around the same time period. Probably the same day as the one at
Binghamton. Around 9:30 to 10:00 o'clock at night.
Q: What did you do?
A: I put two containers filled with blood vials and maybe four or five
small plastic bags next to a big hole next to a big rock with an opening
in between.
Q: Did you throw any into the water?
A: No. When I put the stuff there it was low tide.
JA at 33-34. Villegas did not describe how he put the vials into the River on the
other occasion charged in the indictment, but the evidence showed that he also
discharged numerous blood vials into the Hudson River in Edgewater, New Jersey,
on an earlier date.
Because Villegas, according to his confession, dumped the vials at low tide,
and as such did not put them directly into water, does not mean that the vials
were not discharged into navigable waters. The term "navigable waters" means
"the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas." 33 U.S.C. §
1362(7). The term navigable waters is further defined in the regulations as "all
waters which are currently used, or were used in the past, or may be susceptible
to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all waters which are subject to
the ebb and flow of the tide." 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(1) (1993); 40 C.F.R. §
230.3(s)(1) (1993). Although Villegas said he dumped the vials in the rocks in an
area that at the time was not covered with water, it was in an area that would
be immersed in water at high tide. Thus, the dumping site satisfied the definition
1994]
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remained on many of the vials recovered in Staten Island and
at Edgewater, and which were traced to Plaza Health, and
trial testimony of Plaza Health employees regarding Villegas's
activities at the laboratory, proved that Villegas was responsi-
ble for the dumpings.
After the presentation of evidence, the district court in-
structed the jury that a number of elements were common to
all four counts in the indictment. As to the point source ele-
ment, the district court explained that Congress used the term
"Cpoint source" in the Clean Water Act to distinguish between
water pollution that is traceable to an identifiable source and
pollution that comes from unidentifiable sources. The district
court specifically instructed the jury on the meaning of point
source as follows:
The statute also specifies that only discharges without a permit from
so-called "point sources" are prohibited. Congress chose to distin-
guish between "point sources" and "non-point sources" with the spe-
cific purpose of excluding various kinds of pollution runoff, that is,
runoff produced principally by rainfall that cannot be traced to one
polluter. Congress did not intend to exempt from regulation any
activity that emits pollution from an identifiable point. Congress did
not intend by the term "point source" to distinguish between a per-
son who drives a truck to the edge of the Hudson River and dumps
blood vials, clearly a point source, and a person who gets out of the
truck, takes the vials from the truck, walks to the river's edge and
dumps them from his hand. Removing pollutants from a container,
and a vehicle is a container, parked next to a navigable body of
water and physically throwing the pollutant into the water consti-
tutes a discharge from a point source.3'
The jury convicted Villegas on all four counts in the indict-
ment. Following trial, Villegas made a motion for a judgment
of acquittal."2 With respect to the point source issue, Villegas
argued that his conduct was not a point source discharge un-
der the Clean Water Act, and, in any event, that the district
court improperly instructed the jury on the meaning of point
of "navigable waters."
" Trial Transcript at 469-70, United States v. Villegas, 784 F. Supp. 6
(E.D.N.Y. 1991) (No. CR-89-0338). Thus, the district court instructed the jury that
the defendant's vehicle was the point source, and the fact that Villegas took the
vials from the trunk of his car and dumped them in the River did not convert
Villegas's actions into non-point source discharges.
" Defendant made his motion pursuant to Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
(Vol. 60: 689
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source. Therefore, the defendant argued, his conviction under
the Clean Water Act should be reversed.3
The district court denied the defendant's motion, finding
that Villegas discharged pollutants from a point source. 4 Al-
though the district court upheld the conviction, its decision
denying the judgment of acquittal formed the basis for many of
the misguided conclusions that the Second Circuit would reach
later. As a preliminary matter, rather than upholding the
conviction under the theory of point source it provided to the
jury, the district court instead reformulated its analysis of the
meaning of point source and held that a person can be a point
source under the Clean Water Act. 5 It then restricted its
holding, concluding that a person is not always as a matter of
law a point source under the Act."
The district court first analyzed the words Congress used
to define the term point source. Finding the statutory defini-
tion to be "emphatically inclusive, as reflected in the words
'any,' 'discernible' and 'not limited to'," and further to include
"such a highly general term as 'conveyance'," the district court
concluded that the term point source should be given a broad
interpretation. Villegas's conduct fell within the Clean Wa-
ter Act's coverage, according to the district court, because he
deliberately discharged pollutants into the water.38 The dis-
trict court, however, then restricted, without citation to statu-
tory provisions or legislative history, the circumstances under
which a person's deliberate act of dumping pollutants into the
water could constitute a point source discharge to those in-
stances in which a person discharges pollutants "produced in
the course of a waste-generating activity."39 Finding that
Defendant also argued that, even if Villegas's dumping constituted a point
source discharge, the conviction on the knowing endanger counts nevertheless
should be reversed because the government failed to prove that Villegas knew that
a person was likely to be hurt as a result of his actions.
" United States v. Villegas, 784 F. Supp. 6 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), rev'd, 3 F.3d 643
(2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2764 (1994). The district court, however,
granted the motion relating to the knowing endangerment counts, finding that
there was insufficient evidence that Villegas's conduct created an imminent danger
of hepatitis-B contagion. Villegas, 784 F. Supp. at 13-14.
"' Id. at 8.
6 Id. at 10.
37 Id. at 8-10.
3' Id. at 10.
"' Villegas, 784 F.2d at 9.
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Villegas's dumping was in furtherance of his company's waste-
generating activity, the district court concluded that Villegas's
conduct constituted a point source discharge. The court thus
not only affirmed the conviction on a theory on which the jury
was not instructed, but it also provided a unique interpretation
of the Clean Water Act by holding that a person can be, but is
not always, a point source. As a result, although it believed its
ruling did not create arbitrary or irrational distinctions, ° the
district court in fact set the stage for the Second Circuit's find-
ing that the Clean Water Act is ambiguous as it was applied to
Villegas.
II. THE SECOND CIRCUIT DECISION
On appeal, a panel of the Second Circuit divided on the
case, with Judges Pratt and Kearse voting to reverse the con-
viction and Judge Oakes voting to affirm the conviction on the
knowing discharge counts. The majority continued where the
district court had left off. It too analyzed the point source issue
differently than the district court had when it instructed the
jury and adopted the unsupported restrictions in the Clean
Water Act's coverage that the district court created. But it then
went further by creating its own additional insupportable re-
strictions to the Act's coverage.
The majority held that a person is not a point source for
purposes of the criminal enforcement provisions of the Clean
Water Act. It also held that the Clean Water Act's enforcement
provisions apply only to industrial and municipal discharges.
In reaching this extraordinary holding, the majority analyzed:
(1) the language and structure of the Clean Water Act; (2) the
legislative history and context of the Act; (3) case law inter-
preting the term "point source"; and (4) the regulatory struc-
ture of the Act. It then concluded that these sources mandated
a finding that Villegas's conduct could not be punished as a
violation under the Clean Water Act because "th[e] statute was
never designed to address the random, individual polluter like
Villegas."4'
According to the majority, "[human beings are not among
41 Id. at 10.
41 Plaza Health, 3 F.3d 643, 646 (2d Cir. 1993).
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the enumerated items that may be a 'point source,"' because
the images evoked in the statutory examples of point sources
are those of physical structures, not people.42 Moreover, the
majority believed that, if discharges from human beings could
be point source discharges, it would have been unnecessary for
Congress to include the term "point source" as an element of a
Clean Water Act offense because everyone who polluted the
water could be punished under the Act.4" The court further
explained that it "is evident from a perusal of its many sec-
tions" that the Clean Water Act "generally targets industrial
and municipal sources of pollutants," since "the term 'point
source' is used throughout the statute, but invariably in sen-
tences referencing industrial or municipal discharges.""
The panel majority similarly concluded that the legislative
history adds no support to the proposition that a person can be
a point source of pollution. While acknowledging that the pur-
pose of the Clean Water Act is to "'restore and maintain the
chemical, physical and biological integrity of the Nation's wa-
ters,' ' 4 the court simply dismissed the goal as "admirable"
but not answered by the legislative history of the Act. Instead,
the panel interpreted the legislative history as supporting its
view that Congress adopted the "point source" concept simply
"as a means of identifying industrial polluters."46
Analyzing Clean Water Act case law next, the majority
acknowledged that courts uniformly have given point source an
expansive meaning." But refusing to extend those holdings to
the acts of Villegas, the majority reasoned that point source
has been given a broad interpretation principally in civil penal-
ty or licensing cases where, according to the court, "greater
flexibility of interpretation to further remedial legislative pur-
poses is permitted, and the rule of lenity does not protect a
defendant against statutory ambiguities."4" Considering the
charges against Villegas, the court decided that "the term
42 Id. at 646.
See infra text accompanying note 91.
"Plaza Health, 3 F.3d at 646.
45 Id. at 647 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)).
46 Id.
47 Id. at 648.
"' Id. at 648 (citing Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897,
922 (5th Cir. 1983)).
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'point source' as applied to a human being is at best ambigu-
ous,"4 9 and that the rule of lenity" should be applied to re-
solve the ambiguity in his favor. Finally, the majority found
that the regulatory structure of the Act also offered no support
for the proposition that a person can be a point source.5
Having analyzed the statute, its legislative history, regula-
tory structure and relevant case law, and finding no specific
reference in any of these sources that a person is a point
source, the panel majority applied the rule of lenity and found
that "the [Clean Water Act] did not clearly proscribe Villegas's
conduct and did not accord him fair warning of the sanctions
the law placed on that conduct."52
Judge Oakes dissented. He concluded that the Clean Wa-
ter Act is not ambiguous "with respect to an individual physi-
cally disposing of medical wastes, in quantity, directly into
navigable waters, by means of a controllable, discrete convey-
ance and course of action." 3 According to the dissent, "Con-
gress intended the statute to bar corporate officers from dispos-
ing of corporate waste into navigable waters by hand as well
as by pipe."54 Indeed, the dissent found it incredible that
Villegas honestly could have believed that his conduct did not
violate the law.55
Judge Oakes based his conclusion that a person could be a
point source principally on the broad statutory definition of
point source. He reasoned that "the term 'point source' has
been broadly construed to apply to a wide range of polluting
techniques, so long as the pollutants involved are not just
" Plaza Health, 3 F.3d at 649.
" The rule of lenity is a rule designed to resolve ambiguities in a criminal
statute in favor of a defendant. Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 168
(1990). The Supreme Court repeatedly has cautioned, however, that the rule
should be applied only to cases involving a "grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in
the language and structure of the Act" that cannot be resolved by recourse to all
the normal aids to statutory construction. Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S.
814, 831 (1974) (emphasis added); see also Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S.
453, 463 (1991); Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 409-10 (1991). The
Second Circuit misapplied the rule of lenity to the Clean Water Act's unambiguous
statutory provisions. See supra text accompanying notes 123-31.
61 Plaza Health, 3 F.3d at 649.
52 Id.
"' Id. at 655.
14 Id. at 656.
65 Id.
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humanmade, but reach the navigable waters by human effort
or by leaking from a clear point at which waste water was
collected by human effort."" Concluding his analysis of the
relevant statutory provisions, Judge Oakes explained the ab-
surdity of the panel majority's holding:
I doubt that Congress would have regarded an army of men and
women throwing industrial waste from trucks into a stream as ex-
empt from the statute. Since the Act contains no exemption for de
minimus [sic] violations-since, indeed, many Clean Water Act pros-
ecutions are for a series of small discharges, each of which is treated
as a single violation-I cannot see that one man throwing one day's
worth of medical waste into the ocean differs.... A different read-
ing would encourage corporations perfectly capable of abiding by the
Clean Water Act's requirements to ask their employees to stand
between the company trucks and the sea, thereby transforming
point source pollution (dumping from trucks) into nonpoint source
pollution (dumping by hand). Such a method is controllable, easily
identifiable, and inexcusable. To call it nonpoint source pollution is
to read a technical exception into a statute which attempts to define
in broad terms an activity which may be conducted in many differ-
ent ways."7
Because "the discharge was directly into water, and came from
an identifiable point,""s and Villegas had had fair warning
that his actions were illegal,59 the dissent concluded that
Villegas's conduct was proscribed by the Clean Water Act.
III. THE FLAWS IN THE PANEL MAJORITY'S DECISION
A. A Fundamental Omission from the Second Circuit's
Analysis
While the focus of this Article is on whether the panel
majority erred in holding that a person can never be a point
source, it is of interest, first, to mention a fundamental omis-
sion from the court's analysis. The Circuit refused to analyze
the case according to the point source instruction on which the
jury based its conviction of Villegas. s° The jury was not in-
' Plaza Health, 3 F.3d at 651.
57 Id. at 654.
s Id. at 653.
Id. at 656.
c' While the court correctly noted that the government urged in its appellate
1994]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
structed that a person can be a point source. That issue would
have been relevant to the validity of Villegas's conviction only
if the Clean Water Act were read to require that the last link
in the chain of conveyances that places pollutants in the water
itself must be a point source. Instead, the jury was told that
Villegas's vehicle, as opposed to Villegas himself, was the stat-
utory conveyance.6
While the panel majority's entire analysis appears to be
based on the very assumption that the Act requires the last
link in the pollution process to be the point source, no provi-
sion in the Act requires it. The structure of the Clean Water
Act and relevant case law leads to the conclusion that the
relevant inquiry regarding the existence of a point source need
not focus solely on the last step in the polluting process.62
brief that a human being can be a point source, 3 F.3d at 645, the court ignored
the government's first argument on appeal-that the jury was properly instructed
on the meaning of "point source" and that the jury's conviction based on that in-
struction should stand. The court failed to acknowledge that the government ad-
dressed the issue of a person as a point source (in addition to the relevant issue
of Villegas's car as the point source) in response to arguments made in defendant's
appellate brief and the district court's decision. See Villegas, 784 F. Supp. at 10.
61 Had the court considered the instruction on which the jury convicted
Villegas and determined that the Clean Water Act required the point source to be
the very last link in the chain of events resulting in pollutants entering the wa-
ter, a judgment of acquittal then would have been appropriate only if a person
could never be a point source.
62 An analysis of whether the Act requires the last link in the chain of convey-
ances to be the statutory point source must begin with the meaning of the term
"discharge of a pollutant," which, as set forth infra at text accompanying notes 20-
25, is defined as "any addition of any pollutant from any point source." 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(12). The issue is whether the word "from" in the definition requires that
the discharge be directly from the point source. The Second Circuit answered that
question in the negative in Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343 (2d Cir.
1991), rev'd on other grounds, 112 S. Ct. 2638 (1992). Relying upon United States
v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 438 F. Supp. 945, 947 (W.D. Tenn. 1976), which "rejected
the argument that the pollutants must be discharged directly into navigable
waters" for the Clean Water Act to apply, the Dague court explained that dis-
charges from the city's landfill, which first leached into a pond and then into a
culvert and eventually emptied into a navigable water, was a point source dis-
charge. Dague, 935 F.2d at 1355. Thus, the fact that the pollutants did not enter
the navigable waters directly from the point source did not, in the view of the
Second Circuit, remove the conduct from the Clean Water Act's enforcement provi-
sions. Other courts similarly have held that the pollutant need not enter the navi-
gable waters directly from the point source. See, e.g., Concerned Area Residents for
the Env't v. Southview Farm, No. 93-9229, 1994 WL 480646, at *12 (2d Cir. Sept.
2, 1994) (the activity of manure spreading vehicles (the point source) collecting
liquid manure (the pollutant) for discharge onto fields, and the ultimate flow of
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Had the Second Circuit considered and adopted the instruction
given to the jury, it never would have reached the question of
whether a person could be a point source under the Clean
Water Act. There can be no doubt that a car is a point source
under the Clean Water Act. A car is a conveyance, and a point
source is defined as a "discernible confined and discrete convey-
ance."63 Moreover, the statutory definition includes rolling
stock, a type of moving vehicle.' Furthermore, a vehicle, in
the Second Circuit's words, "evoke[s] images of physical struc-
tures and instrumentalities that systematically act as a means
of conveying pollutants from an industrial source to navigable
waters." 5 Whether or not Villegas himself could have been
considered a point source, the jury unquestionably found that
he "added" a pollutant to the Hudson River "from" a "discern-
ible, confined and discrete conveyance"-his car. This critical
omission from the court's analysis resulted in the court instead
addressing whether a person can be a point source and erro-
neously concluding that an individual cannot.
B. The Panel Majority's Analytical Flaws
The panel majority concluded, after analyzing the Clean
Water Act's relevant statutory language, legislative history,
the manure into navigable waters, constitutes a point source discharge under the
Clean Water Act); United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361 (D.N.H.
1985) (a point source discharge includes the collection of pollutants in a ditch,
which then enter a brook and from the brook ultimately enter navigable waters).
33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (emphasis added).
"Rolling stock" is defined as "the wheeled vehicles owned and used by a
railroad or motor carrier." WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DIcTIONARY 996 (3d ed.
1981). Case law similarly has referred to rolling stock as moving vehicles of a
railroad. See, e.g., San Francisco & S.J.V. Ry. Co. v. City of Stockton, 84 P. 771,
774 (1906) ("[Railroad] property, included in the term 'rolling stock,' which is in
one place today and in another tomorrow, being continually carried along the line
of the road in the actual operation thereof, owing to its character and use, has no
actual situs.").
" Plaza Health, 3 F.3d at 646. Indeed, numerous courts, including the Second
Circuit, have held that dump trucks, backhoes and other types of vehicles are
point sources under the Act. See, e.g., Southview Farm, No. 93-9229, 1994 WL
480646, at *12 (liquid manure spreading machines as point sources); Avoyelles
Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 922 (5th Cir. 1983) (bulldozers
and backhoes as point sources); United States v. Tull, 615 F. Supp. 610, 622 (E.D.
Va. 1983) (bulldozers and dump trucks as point sources), aff'd, 769 F.2d 182 (4th
Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 412 (1987); United States v. Weisman,
489 F. Supp. 1331, 1337 (M.D. Fla. 1980) (same).
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case law and regulatory structure and after resorting to the
rule of lenity, that a person can never be a point source under
the Clean Water Act. A similar journey down this same analyt-
ic path demonstrates that the panel majority decided at the
outset that the Clean Water Act "was never designed to ad-
dress the random, individual polluter like Villegas," and, to
justify that conclusion, employed an uncharted and insupport-
able analysis each step of the way.
1. The Language and Structure of the Clean Water Act
The plain language of the Act makes clear that a person is
a point source. The operative word in the definition of "point
source" is the word "conveyance."" Conveyance is defined as a
"means or way of conveying."67 The definition of "to convey" is
"to cause to pass from one place or person to another."" The
terms that modify the term "conveyance"--"discernible," "con-
fined" and "discrete"-simply mean identifiable.69 Moreover,
the word "conveyance" is preceded by the word "any," an obvi-
ously inclusive term. Therefore, a point source is "any identifi-
able means or way of causing to pass from one place to anoth-
er." Certainly the unambiguous meaning of these words leads
to the conclusion that a person is a point source." A person is
a conveyance, being identifiable and capable of taking objects
from one place to another. It follows, therefore, that a person
who transmits pollutants from a vehicle to a navigable water-
6 Indeed, point sources have been described generally as being any identifiable
conveyance of pollutants. See 5 ROBERT E. BECK, WATERS & WATER RIGHTS §
53.01(b)(3), at 216-17 (1991).
67 WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 287 (9th ed. 1988). When
operative words of a statute are not defined therein, it is appropriate to resort to
a dictionary for their meaning. Harris v. Sullivan, 968 F.2d 263, 265 (2d Cir.
1992).
68 WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY, supra note 67, at 287.
69 "To discern" is defined as "to recognize or identify as separate and distinct."
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY, supra note 67, at 360. "To confine" is defined as "to hold
within a location." Id. at 275. "Discrete" is defined as "individually distinct." Id. at
362.
7' A vehicle also is a point source because it, too, is capable of carrying objects
from one place to another. However, because the Second Circuit's analysis focuses
only upon the issue of whether a person is a point source, this section of the
Article does not specifically discuss the ways in which a vehicle also squarely fits
within the statutory definition of point source.
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way falls squarely within the definition of a point source dis-
charge.
Even if the plain meaning of the operative words used to
define point source were somehow ambiguous either generally
or as applied to Villegas's conduct specifically, application of
general rules of statutory construction to the Act's language
establishes that a person is a point source. Congress made
clear the breadth of the Act's reach by including a wide-rang-
ing, nonexclusive statutory list of examples of point sources
and preceding those examples with the language "including but
not limited to,"'" to cover the vast numbers and types of point
sources. 2 It is a general principle of statutory construction
that when words of inclusion, such as "including but not limit-
ed to," are followed by examples of the term being defined,
Congress intended the term to be interpreted expansively, not
narrowly.
73
Since the Clean Water Act's promulgation, courts have
interpreted the term "point source" broadly. In National Wild-
life Federation v. Gorsuch,4 the court applied the above-de-
scribed principle of statutory construction, noting that the
definition of "point source" is an example of a term in the
Clean Water Act which is meant to be read expansively. 5 The
court in Kennecott Copper v. Environmental Protection Agen-
cy 6 found that Congress defined the term point source broad-
ly in contemplation of its application to countless pollution
sources. 77 Similarly, in United States v. Earth Sciences,
"' 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1988).
72 See Federal Land Bank v. Bismark Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 100 (1941)
("including is not one of all embracing definition, but simply connotes an illustra-
tive application of general principle").
"' One district court explained this principle of statutory construction as fol-
lows:
A term whose statutory definition declares what it "includes" is more
susceptible to extension of meaning by construction than where the defi-
nition declared what a term "means." It has been said "the word includes
is usually a term of enlargement, and not of limitation .... It, therefore,
conveys the conclusion that there are other items includible, though not
specifically enumerated ... "
City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 697 F. Supp. 677, 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (quoting
NORMAN J. SINGER, 2A STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.07 (4th ed.
1984)).
74 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
75 Id. at 172 n.49.
76 612 F.2d 1232 (10th Cir. 1979).
' In Kennecott, the court stated that the term "point source" should be defined
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Inc.,' the court held that the term point source should be ex-
pansively defined:
Beginning with the Congressional intent to eliminate pollution from
the nation's waters by 1985, the [Clean Water Act] was designed to
regulate to the fullest extent possible those sources emitting pollu-
tion into rivers, streams and lakes. The touchstone of the regulatory
scheme is that those needing to use the waters for waste distribu-
tion must seek and obtain a permit to discharge that waste, with the
quantity and quality of the discharge regulated. The concept of a
point source was designed to further this scheme by embracing the
broadest possible definition of any identifiable conveyance from
which pollutants might enter the waters of the United States. 19
Indeed, just two years before the Plaza Health decision, the
Second Circuit in Dague v. City of Burlington,80 applied the
principle of statutory construction to conclude that the term
point source should be broadly interpreted.81 In so holding,
the Dague court noted that the definition of "discharge of pol-
lutant" refers to a discharge from "'any point source' without
limitation."82 Moreover, in his dissenting opinion, Judge
Oakes explained that "[als the linguistic hint 'any' before...
'point source' suggests, the term [is] to be construed broad-
ly." 3 Finally, the district court recognized that the language
Congress used in defining point source "is emphatically inclu-
sive, as reflected in the words 'any,' 'discernible' and 'not limit-
ed to.' ,,84
broadly "given its contemplated applicability to literally thousands of pollution
sources." Id. at 1243. On appeal, Villegas contended that the use of the words
"thousands" rather than "millions" in Kennecott suggests that human beings, and
presumably vehicles, cannot be point sources because there are more than thou-
sands of people. While it is unclear whether the Second Circuit considered this
argument of defendant's in reaching its holding, it deserves mention that the ref-
erence to "thousands" in the Kennecott decision was to pollution sources, and not
to the number of each source that exists in the universe. Indeed, like people,
there are undoubtedly millions of pipes, containers and vessels; yet all of these
conveyances are specifically enumerated point sources under the statute.
78 599 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1979).
" Id. at 373 (emphasis added).
80 935 F.2d 1343 (2d Cir. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 112 S. Ct. 2638 (1992).
" Ironically, the Dague decision was authored by Judge Pratt, the author of
the panel majority in Plaza Health.
82 Id. at 1355 (emphasis added).
Plaza Health, 3 F.3d at 654.
" United States v. Villegas, 784 F. Supp. 6, 8 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), rev'd, 3 F.3d
643 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2764 (1994).
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Congress further expressed its intention that the term
"point source" be broadly interpreted by including specific,
limited examples of what is not a point source. Congress pro-
vided two specific exclusions in the definition of point
source--"agricultural stormwater discharges and return flows
from irrigated agriculture."85 Congress thus made it clear that
the only source of pollution it meant to exempt from the Act's
coverage is runoff pollution-pollution that is not traceable to
a confined and discrete source. 6 It is another general rule of
statutory construction that when Congress enumerates excep-
tions to a general prohibition, no other exceptions are to be ap-
plied."
The majority also ignored the fundamental purpose for
including point source as an element of the offense. The defini-
tion of point source is included to distinguish between unper-
mitted point source discharges (which are federally enforceable
under the Clean Water Act)8 and non-point source pollution
(which is subject only to state regulation under the Clean Wa-
ter Act). 9 As the dissent understood: "The structure of the
statute ... indicates that the term 'point source' was included
" 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
"See OFFICE OF WATER REGULATIONS AND STANDARDS, ENVIRONMENTAL PRO-
TECTION AGENCY, NON-POINT SOURCE GUIDANCE 3 (1987) ("In practical terms, non-
point source pollution does not result from a discharge at a single location (such
as a single pipe) but generally results from land runoff, precipitation, atmospheric
deposition, or percolation."). Numerous courts have held that Congress included the
term "point source" in the Clean Water Act to ensure that the Act regulated pollu-
tion emanating from an identifiable point, while leaving regulation of surface run-
off pollution to the individual states. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Abston Constr. Co.,
620 F.2d 41, 44 (5th Cir. 1980) ("The focus of this Act is on the 'discernable, con-
fined and discrete' conveyance of the pollutant, which would exclude natural rain-
fall drainage over a broad area.").
' See, e.g., Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17 (1987) ("as a
general rule of statutory construction, the expression of one exception indicates
that no other exceptions apply"); Israel-British Bank Ltd. v. Federal Deposit Ins.
Corp., 536 F.2d 509, 513 (2d Cir.) ("the normal rule of construction is that where
words of exception are used, they are to be strictly construed to limit the excep-
tion"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 978 (1976); Colorado Pub. Interest Res. Group, Inc. v.
Train, 507 F.2d 743, 747 (10th Cir.) ("Another cardinal rule of statutory construc-
tion is that where the legislature has acted to except certain categories from the
operation of a particular law, it is to be presumed that the legislature in its ex-
ceptions intended to go only as far as it did, and that additional exceptions by
implication are not favored."), rev'd on other grounds, 96 U.S. 1938 (1974).
88 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988).
89 See id. § 1288 (Supp. V 1993).
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in the definition of discharge so as to ensure that nonpoint
source pollution would not be covered."'
Examining the above principles of statutory construction
together, it is difficult to imagine a statutory definition more
forcefully requiring a broad interpretation. Yet the majority
simply ignored these established principles, and instead con-
cluded that "if every discharge involving humans were to be
considered a 'discharge from a point source', the statute's
lengthy definition of 'point source' would have been unneces-
sary."9
1
The logic employed by the majority in fact supports the
proposition that the Clean Water Act is intended to punish the
conduct of individuals like Villegas. Unlike the non-exclusive
examples of point sources, Congress used no such words of
expansion to delineate what is not a point source. Presumably
Congress decided not to include similar, expansive words, and
did not include human beings among the specific exceptions to
what can be a point source, because it did not intend to exempt
from the Clean Water Act's enforcement provisions, including
its criminal provisions, individuals who pollute the waters of
the United States by wanton, deliberate acts. Rather, Congress
included the term point source to make it clear that all pollu-
tion discharges but runoff pollution are covered under the
statute.92 It is not within the court's powers to add an excep-
tion to a statute's coverage which Congress chose not to in-
clude.
The majority also erroneously concluded that if a human
being were included in the definition of "point sources," the
statute would not make linguistic sense. The majority reasoned
that, because the term "point source" is defined as "'any addi-
tion of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point
source,"' and because "§ 1311(a) reads in effect 'the addition of
any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source by any
person shall be unlawful," if a human being were included in
the definition of point source "the prohibition would then read
'the addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any
person by any person shall be unlawful."93
" Plaza Health, 3 F.3d at 653.
91 Id. at 646.
' See supra note 62.
Plaza Health, 3 F.3d at 647. As a preliminary matter, the majority's reason-
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The majority's reasoning is nothing more than a linguistic
game to create an ambiguity in an unambiguous statute. A fair
reading of the prohibition of section 1311(a) is that "the addi-
tion of any pollutant to navigable waters from any identifiable,
confined and discrete conveyance or point by any person shall
be unlawful." The term "person" as used in section 1311 identi-
fies the party or parties responsible for the conduct prohibited
by the Act. The word "person" within the definition of point
source, in contrast, refers to the means by which the pollutant
enters the water-the discrete and confined point source of the
pollution. Indeed, as should be evident, a person responsible
under section 1311 may often be different from the person who
actually introduces the pollutant into the water.
For example, a corporate officer could order a worker to
dump toxic chemicals into the water and inform the employee
that the company has a permit for such dumping. Based upon
his belief that the discharge is permitted, the employee then
would dump the chemicals into the water. The company officer
(the "person" for purposes of section 1311(a)) is guilty of a
Clean Water Act crime because he knowingly caused pollutants
to be dumped into the water without a permit.94 This is so
even though the employee was the "person" who dumped (or
conveyed) the pollutants into the water and was, therefore, the
point source discharge. Thus, the responsible "person" for pur-
poses of section 1311(a) criminal liability could be, and fre-
quently is, different from the "person" who actually discharges
the pollutant to the water.
The dissent recognized this structural aspect of the Act,
criticizing the majority's stretch to find ambiguity in an unam-
biguous statute. 5 Flatly rejecting the majority's analysis of
ing again ignores that the jury was instructed that the conveyance was Villegas's
car, not Villegas himself. Based on that instruction, the statute would "make lin-
guistic sense" even under the majority's reasoning. See supra text accompanying
notes 60-65.
14 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1319(c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
"5 Judge Oakes explained the majority's misreading of the statute as follows:
My colleagues suggest that a person can never be a point source, relying
heavily on the supposed redundancy produced when the Act's language
barring the "discharge of any pollutant by any person" is read with the
definitional terms placed in terms of the linguistic variables, as follows:
"any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from a person by a
person." Granted, this sounds odd. But I believe the oddity is an artifact
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the supposed linguistic anomaly between sections 1311(a) and
1362(12) if a person were deemed a point source, Judge Oakes
stated
I do not think technical arguments about whether the toxic sub-
stances were in discrete containers are fruitful when the activity is
discrete, conveys pollutants, and is confined to a clear, traceable
single source. When a company chooses to use the nation's waters as
a dumpsite for waste it has created and gathered in a manageable
place, it should ask for a permit or face prosecution.'
2. Legislative History
The majority next undertook a perusal of the legislative
history of the Clean Water Act. Acknowledging that the legis-
lative history does not elucidate the term "point source,"97 the
majority resorted to random excerpts from the 1972 Senate
Report pertaining to the Clean Water Act," suggesting that
of assuming that the term "person" means the same thing in both parts
of the sentence, and that in both cases it means what it means in every-
day language.
The apparent oddness disappears when one grasps that the first
term "person" in the peculiar sentence means "a person acting as a point
source" and that the second term "person" has been defined, typically for
statutes imposing responsibility on a variety of parties, but not typically
for ordinary speech, as a responsible party .... Thus, for example, one
could fill in the linguistic variables as follows: the Act bars the addition
of any pollutant to navigable waters by an employee's throwing them
there (a person acting as a point source) at the instruction of his or her
employer (a corporation, or person capable of being held responsible) and
in particular of his or her supervisor (also a person capable of being held
responsible). More specifically, the sentence could refer to an individual
hired to convey, by hand, all of a corporation's toxic wastes from the
company's back door to the Mississippi River, three feet away (the point
source), by that individual and by the corporation which authorized the
disposal (the potential defendants).
Plaza Health, 3 F.3d at 654 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
'6 Id. at 654-55.
97 Id. at 647.
" The first excerpt merely explains that the Clean Water Act does not apply
to and is not intended to provide an enforcement mechanism for non-point source
pollution; that is, pollution resulting from runoff. See Plaza Health, 3 F.3d at 647.
As the legislative history explains, control of pollutants from runoff rests with the
states or other local agencies. Judge Oakes understood this distinction clearly. See
id. at 653 (dissenting opinion). The second excerpt is a quote of Senator Robert
Dole from the 1972 Senate Report on the Clean Water Act. That statement simi-
larly states exactly what Congress provided in the definition of point source-that
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these excerpts illustrate that Congress's focus when amending
the Act was on industrial polluters only.9 Based upon these
excerpts, neither of which state or suggest that the Clean Wa-
ter Act is intended to address industrial pollution exclusively,
the majority concluded that the Act's enforcement provisions
cover industrial and municipal polluters only. From this, the
majority concluded, Villegas's activities were not punishable
under the Clean Water Act because they were the act of an
individual, not of an industrial or municipal polluter.' 0
Preliminarily, it is difficult to make objective sense of the
majority's conclusion that Villegas was not an industrial pol-
luter. Villegas was convicted, after all, of polluting a major
New York City waterway with medical waste that originated
from the blood testing laboratory of which he was a fifty per-
cent owner and vice-president. As Judge Oakes opined, "I
think it plain enough that Congress intended the statute to bar
corporate officers from disposing of corporate waste into navi-
gable waters by hand as well as by pipe."'
In any event, even if it could somehow be convincingly
argued that Villegas's dumping was not industrial, the
majority's reasoning nevertheless is insupportable. No provi-
sion of the Clean Water Act or its legislative history addresses
the type of polluter that the Act is intended to target. To the
contrary, the statute addresses the types of pollutants that
cannot be discharged into United States waters without a
permit. The Act clearly prohibits polluting the waters with all
things that do not naturally occur in the waters, things that
certainly can and are dumped both by the regulated communi-
ty and by random, individual dumpers.0 2 There is no ques-
tion that a person who dumps blood vials (or for that matter
candy wrappers) into the water constitutes an identifiable
the term "point source" does not include non-point sources of pollution, such as
agricultural runoff of pesticides and fertilizers into adjacent waters. See id. at 653.
" See, e.g., Plaza Health, 3 F.3d at 647.
10 Id. at 646, 650. Presumably, even if a conveyance other than Villegas's hand
had been the last link in the chain of events leading up to the vials' discharge
into the water, the panel majority nonetheless would have found the Clean Water
Act's criminal provision inapplicable to Villegas's conduct because, in its opinion
neither Villegas nor his company "systematically" or regularly dumped used vials
into the water. See id. at 646.
101 Id. at 656.
1 See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (definition of pollutants).
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pollution source and, therefore, does not fall within the limits
of non-point source pollution.
Indeed, the majority's reasoning is conclusively refuted
when one looks at the Act's definition of "pollutants." If Con-
gress had intended the statute to proscribe discharges of indus-
trial and municipal wastes only, it would not have included
"industrial [and] municipal.., waste"1 3 as types of pollut-
ants. Furthermore, it certainly would not have included "solid
waste ... and garbage"' °4 as other types of pollutants since
those wastes are generated by industries, municipalities and
individuals alike. Moreover, even if the Act's emphasis were on
curbing industrial and municipal pollution, that does not
mean, absent a specific statement by Congress, that that is all
the Clean Water Act is meant to cover. That the statutory
language can be read to include certain evils does not mean
that such language must be read to exclude other evils (such as
dumping from a truck by hand), which also fall within the
broad statutory terms chosen by Congress. l"' Indeed, as
Judge Oakes explained, "the legislative history indicates that
the Act was meant to control periodic, as well as continuous,
discharges."'' 6 Reviewing the legislative history, Judge Oakes
understood that by regulating point source pollution, Congress
merely intended to exclude from the Act's coverage non-point
sources of pollution. As he recognized, this exclusion of non-
point source pollution was not insignificant: "Nonetheless, the
term 'point source' sets significant definitional limits on the
reach of the Clean Water Act. Fifty percent or more of all wa-
ter pollution is thought to come from nonpoint sources.' 0 7
103 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6).
104 Id.
105 See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2050, 2055 (1993); Moskal v.
United States, 498 U.S. 103, 111 (1990); Pittson Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S.
105, 115 (1988).
1 Plaza Health, 3 F.3d at 651.
Id. at 652; see also William Pedersen, Jr., Turning the Tide on Water Quali-
ty, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 69 n.10 (1988). Yet while Judge Oakes understood Congress's
intention to distinguish between point and non-point source pollution, he curiously
agreed with the majority that the statute is ambiguous as applied to individual
litterers. Plaza Health, 3 F.3d at 655. In recognizing such a distinction, Judge
Oakes seems to contradict his earlier statement that the statute does not contain
an exception for de minimis violations. Id. at 654. Judge Oakes did not consider
Villegas such a random litterer, however, because Villegas dumped waste gener-
ated by his company. Id.
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The majority appears to have created the industrial and
municipal discharge requirement for Clean Water Act enforce-
ment to alleviate its stated concern that, if a person could be a
point source, then a person could be prosecuted under the
Clean Water Act for flinging a candy wrapper or for urinating
into a navigable water. °8 This concern is unfounded. While
such conduct might technically be punishable under the Clean
Water Act's broadly drafted enforcement provisions, these
types of negligible discharges are not the enforcement focus of
the Act nor, based on a perusal of civil and criminal Clean
Water Act enforcement actions, are they a focus of those who
prosecute violations of the Act. Merely because one is able to
conjure up a fact pattern that would involve an undoubtedly
unreasonable prosecution-such as bringing a felony charge
under the Clean Water Act against a person for throwing a
candy wrapper into the Hudson River-an alarmist hypotheti-
cal is not sufficient reason to render an unambiguous statute
ambiguous."0 9
As the Second Circuit explained in United States v. FMC
Corp.," in the context of construing the criminal provision of
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act,"' hypothetically abusive pros-
ecutions not presented in the case itself, do not change a
statute's viability or its application to the conduct of defendant:
Certainly construction that would bring every killing within the
statute, such as deaths caused by automobiles, airplanes, plate glass
modern office buildings or picture windows in residential dwellings
in to which birds fly, would offend reason and common sense. As
stated in one of the early decisions under the Act, "[ain innocent
technical violation on the part of any defendant can be taken care of
by the imposition of a small or nominal fine." Such situations prop-
erly can be left to the sound discretion of prosecutors and the
courts.
1 1 2
... Plaza Health, 3 F.3d at 647.
1" In any case, the prosecution of Villegas was not such an unreasonable prose-
cution.
110 572 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1978).
1 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1988). FMC Corp. set forth the pertinent provisions of the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act as follows: "it shall be unlawful at any time, by any
means or in any manner, to . . . kill . . . any migratory bird . . . included in the
terms of the conventions between the United States and Great Britain .. . [Mexi-
co] . . . [and Japan]." 16 U.S.C. § 703. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d. at 903.
. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d at 905 (citation omitted).
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Imposing criminal liability on FMC did not dictate that some
other party would face prosecution-which, moreover, was
premised upon a strict liability theory"-for the death of every
bird. The court upheld prosecution of FMC."'
The majority searched the legislative history to find an
ambiguity and, finding none, wrongfully rewrote the Act on its
own initiative simply because it was possible to imagine a
prosecution for conduct as innocuous as throwing a candy
wrapper or urinating into the water. By rewriting the Clean
Water Act to limit its scope to industrial and municipal dis-
charges, the Second Circuit undermined the statutory goal of
eliminating discharges of pollution into the nation's waters by
1985,1" and ensures that, at least in the Second Circuit, the
government not only cannot prosecute an individual for dump-
ing a candy wrapper into the water but it also cannot prose-
cute any human polluter for dumping blood vials, toxins or
other harmful pollutants into our waters if the last contact
with those pollutants before they enter the water is a human
hand.
3. Case Law
The majority next discussed the case law that addressed
the meaning of the term "point source," acknowledging that
courts have interpreted the meaning of that term broadly,
giving point source an expansive meaning.'15 Without further
11 Id. at 908. Cf. United States v. National Dairy Prods., 372 U.S. 29, 32-33
(1963) (the mens rea requirements for the Act should be interpreted in light of the
conduct with which the defendant is charged, not in light of potentially marginal
offenses that may fall within its statutory language). See also Village of Hoffman
Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 503-04 (1982).
114 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1).
... Plaza Health, 3 F.3d at 648. Indeed, the panel majority's decision conflicts
with decisions from other courts that have found the plain language of the Clean
Water Act to embrace a broad array of polluting conduct that is logically indistin-
guishable from Villegas's conduct. For example, in Avoyelles Sportsmen's League,
Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 922 (1983), the court concluded that bulldozers and
backhoes used to effect a discharge into navigable waters are statutory point
sources. The fact that human intervention manifestly is necessary for a backhoe or
a bulldozer to convey pollutants into water did not stop the Fifth Circuit from
applying the Act as written. See also United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599
F.2d 368, 373 (10th Cir. 1979) (runoff collected by mining operation that escapes
through a fissure in a berm or an overflow of a wall is a discharge from a point
(Vol. 60: 689
WHAT'S THE "POINT" OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT?
explanation, however, the court simply disregarded these cases
on the theory that the reported cases were mostly civil, and
not criminal, cases. That distinction is legally unsound.
Congress gave the term "point source" only one meaning,
and applied that definition for the Act's civil and criminal
provisions alike. Under such circumstances, words have the
same meaning whether they are being applied to a civil or
criminal action. Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
recognized that language that is capable of civil and criminal
applications must receive the same construction in both con-
texts, and the rule of lenity does not change that principle of
consistency.116 While the Second Circuit previously applied
this same principle of consistency to other cases,"1 it square-
ly violated the principle in Plaza Health.
Moreover, the court's eagerness in Plaza Health to con-
strue the terms of the Clean Water Act narrowly because of
the criminal context is, as evident from the cases cited below,
contrary to statutory construction that is readily applied to
environmental cases. Because environmental statutes are pub-
lic welfare statutes, a reasonable person should know that his
source); United States v. Tull, 615 F. Supp. 610, 622 (E.D. Va. 1983) (discharges
into water from bulldozers and dump trucks are point source discharges); United
States v. Weisman, 489 F. Supp. 1331, 1337 (M.D. Fla. 1980) (same); Barcelo v.
Brown, 478 F. Supp. 646, 664 (D.P.R. 1979) (release or firing of ordnance from
aircraft is a discharge from a point source), aff'd, 643 F.2d 835, 861-62 (1st Cir.
1981), rev'd on other grounds, 456 U.S. 305 (1982).
Judge Oakes would have followed the analysis of the above cases. As he
explained:
[Clourts have deemed a broad range of means of depositing pollutants in
the country's navigable waters to be point sources.
In short, the term "point source" has been broadly construed to ap-
ply to a wide range of polluting techniques, so long as the pollutants
involved are not just humannade, but reach the navigable waters by
human effort or by leaking from a clear point at which waste water was
collected by human effort. From these cases, the writers of one respected
treatise have concluded that such a "man-induced gathering mechanism
plainly is the essential characteristic of a point source" and that a point
source, "[plut simply ... is an identifiable conveyance of pollutants."
3 F.3d at 651 (citations omitted).
1" See, e.g., National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798, 806
(1994); United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 112 S. Ct. 2102, 2110 n.10
(1992) (plurality opinion); see also id. at 2110 (Scalia, J., concurring).




or her activity is subject to stringent public regulation, and
thus courts generally apply a broad construction to such
statutes' terms. Indeed, courts of appeals interpreting the
criminal provisions of the Clean Water Act and other environ-
mental statutes uniformly have held that their terms should be
construed broadly."'
4. Regulatory Structure
The panel majority looked last to the regulatory structure
of the Clean Water Act to determine whether the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency considers a human being to be a point
source and concluded, again without authority, that it does
not. In reaching this conclusion, the majority relied upon sec-
tion 122.2 of Title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations, which
defines "discharge of a pollutant.""9
Contrary to the majority's conclusion, the regulation is, in
fact, consistent with the interpretation that a human being is a
point source. The regulation, like the statute, provides exam-
ples of types of conduct constituting a discharge of a pollut-
ant.2 ° Included in that definition is the addition of pollutants
into the water from "surface runoff which is collected or chan-
nelled by man" and "discharges through... conveyances."'
A human being unquestionably is contemplated as a type of
point source under the regulations. As previously discussed,
not only is a person a type of conveyance capable of discharg-
ing pollutants into navigable waters, 22 but a person also is
118 See, e.g., United States v. Dean, 969 F.2d 187, 191 (6th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Baytank, 934 F.2d 599, 613 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Dee, 912
F.2d 741, 745 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 919 (1991); United States v.
Carr, 880 F.2d 1550, 1554 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033,
1038 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1083 (1990); United States v. Hayes
Int'l, 786 F.2d 1499, 1503 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Johnson & Towers,
741 F.2d 662, 666 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985). Contra Unit-
ed States v. Berowski, 977 F.2d 27, 32 n.9 (1st Cir. 1992).
119 40 C.F.R § 122.2 (1993). The regulatory definition is virtually identical to
the statutory definition of "discharge of a pollutant." See supra text accompanying
note 24.
12 Section 122.2 also includes a definition of "point source." 33 C.F.R. § 122.2.
That definition is identical to the definition of that term in the Clean Water Act.
See supra text accompanying note 26.
121 33 C.F.R. § 122.2.
122 See supra text accompanying notes 66-96.
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expressly contemplated as a link in the chain of events by
which pollutants enter the water.
5. The Rule of Lenity
It is hard to imagine that when Villegas dumped hundreds
of blood vials into the Hudson River, some of which he knew
contained hepatitis-B infected blood, he thought his conduct
was lawful. Yet that is the conclusion the majority reached
when it applied the rule of lenity to overturn Villegas's convic-
tion. To call the Clean Water Act ambiguous as applied to
Villegas's conduct is to do an injustice to the plain language of
the statute and its legislative goal.
As explained above, the rule of lenity is not applicable to
statutory construction unless there is a "grievous ambiguity" in
a statute'2 such that, even after a court has ""'seize[d] every
thing from which aid can be derived' it is still 'left with an
ambiguous statute.'"'124 The rule of lenity cannot be used to
beget an ambiguity "merely because it [is] possible to articulate
a construction more narrow than that urged by the Govern-
ment."'25 Nor is a statute ambiguous for purposes of lenity
because a particular application of clear statutory language
was not contemplated by Congress; that a statute "has not
been applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Con-
gress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates
breadth. ,26
The panel majority disregarded these principles, instead
creating an ambiguity where none before had existed. As ex-
plained earlier, 127 the common definition of the words Con-
gress used in the definition of "point source," such as "convey-
ance," affirmatively demonstrate that Congress meant human
discharges such as Villegas's to be proscribed point source dis-
" Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 831 (1974); see also supra note
50.
124 Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 463 (quoting United States v.
Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971) (quoting United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch)
358, 386 (1805))).
" Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990); see also Smith v. United
States, 113 S. Ct. 2050, 2059 (1993).
126 National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798, 806 (1994) (quot-
ing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985)).
" See supra text accompanying notes 66-96.
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charges.12 Moreover, even if the statutory language were not
evident on its face, general principles of statutory construction
resolve the meaning of point source as that term is defined in
the Act. Imposing the majority's restrictive reading of the term
point source "does violence not only to the structure and lan-
guage of the statute, but to its purpose as well."129 The pur-
pose of the Act, like its terms, is not ambiguous: "to restore
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
the Nation's waters" and to eliminate the discharge of pollut-
ants into the nation's waters. 30
The majority's holding that the Act ceases to apply when a
human being is placed between the water and the pollutant is
not a viable interpretation of the statutory language. It is
instead the court's speculation about the limits it believes
Congress would have placed on the Clean Water Act had it
thought about discharges like those of Villegas's. Such specula-
tion, however, not only is unfounded in the statutory language
and the Act's legislative history, but in fact conflicts with the
broad, clear and unambiguous language Congress chose to use
when defining the relevant statutory terms. As Judge Oakes
aptly concluded,
I do not think the Clean Water Act is ambiguous with respect to an
individual physically disposing of medical wastes, in quantity, di-
rectly into navigable waters, by means of a controllable, discrete
conveyance and course of action.
Having resorted to the language and structure, legislative
history and motivating policies of the Clean Water Act, I think it
plain enough that Congress intended the statute to bar corporate
officers from disposing of corporate waste into navigable waters by
hand as well as by pipe. Further, I note that this is not the sort of
activity that Villegas could honestly have believed violated no stat-
ute, whether promulgated by federal, state, or local authorities.
Thus, this is not a case in which the defendant had no fair warning
that his actions were illegal. No compliance attorney here could
have struggled with the difficulty of deciding whether this was activ-
ity for which a permit should be sought[;] rather, an attorney asked
to advise Villegas whether his activity was permissible might say
that there was as yet no case law indicating that such activity was
point source pollution under the Clean Water Act, but that such a
128 See Smith, 113 S. Ct. at 2060.
129 Id.
130 33 U.S.C. § 1251.
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view was certainly consistent with the Act and that the behavior
would almost certainly be proscribed by that Act or some other.13'
IV. TROUBLED WATERS AHEAD FOR CLEAN WATER ACT
ENFORCEMENT IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT
The far-reaching implications of the majority decision
cannot be underestimated. The Second Circuit left more
questions unresolved than it answered, and created countless
loopholes for clever-or lucky-polluters (like Villegas) that
may serve to defeat the worthy goals of the statute.
By ruling that the Clean Water Act applies only to "indus-
trial and municipal discharges," and then compounding its
unfortunate construction of the Act by ruling that Villegas's
dumpings from his blood testing laboratory were not industrial
discharges, the panel majority in essence has given a green
light to individuals to dump in the nation's water at will, with-
out penalty. The majority decision permits the dumping of any
non-industrial and non-municipal waste into the water, regard-
less of the means by which the pollutants enter the water.
Even if an enumerated point source, like a pipe, is the last link
in the chain of events leading pollutants into the water, the
panel majority's decision would require law enforcement au-
thorities to ignore such conduct unless the pollutants were
regularly discharged into the water from an industrial facility
or a municipality.
The court's reasoning, however, is clearly suspect. If Con-
gress intended this result, why would Congress have distin-
guished between point source and non-point source water pol-
lution, rather than just industrial versus non-industrial pollu-
tion? Why would Congress have included pipes, for example, as
a type of point source? Furthermore, if the Second Circuit's
analysis is correct, why did Congress fail to exclude de minimis
discharges from the definitions of "discharge of pollutants,"
"point source" and other statutory term?'32
The court's ruling particularly eviscerates Clean Water Act
wetlands enforcement.3 in the Second Circuit because viola-
... Plaza Health, 3 F.3d at 656.
132 See id. at 654.
" Pursuant to § 1344 of the Clean Water Act, no fill material may be placed
1994]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
tions of the wetlands regulations are most frequently found
among individual, not commercial or industrial, actors.' A
property owner now has a defense to a Clean Water Act prose-
cution for knowingly dumping large quantities of fill material
into federally protected wetlands without a permit. Congress
most likely would not have included the Clean Water Act's
wetlands provisions if it intended to exempt from enforcement
the principal violators.
Still other questions remain. As to doctors and medical
laboratory executives, at least, the Plaza Health decision does
not answer whether their dumpings can ever be point source
discharges. Perhaps, under the majority's analysis, if a medical
laboratory used the nation's waters as the dumpsite for its
medical waste more regularly than Villegas did, and the
dumpings were accomplished by means other than a human
hand, the Second Circuit would consider such activity industri-
al discharges and hold, therefore, that the Clean Water Act
renders such conduct punishable.'35 But if that were a proper
interpretation of the Act, again, Congress would have exempt-
ed de minimis discharge from the Act's coverage.
The court's ruling limiting the Act's coverage to industrial
and municipal discharges also seriously threatens the quality
of the nation's waters themselves. The country's lakes, rivers
and streams can be, and are being, polluted by a variety of
sources. Indeed, any one discharge is unlikely alone to contam-
inate significantly a large body of water, yet the cumulative
impact of numerous, smaller discharges can destroy ecosys-
in wetlands without a permit issued by the Army Corps of Engineers, the federal
agency authorized to issue such permits. 33 U.S.C. § 1344. Violations of § 1344
are punishable both civilly and criminally.
... A typical wetlands enforcement action involves an individual property owner
filling in a wetland to construct a home, driveway, dock or other structure without
a permit. See, e.g., United States v. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719 (3d Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1052 (1994) (civil injunctive relief for wetlands filling by individ-
ual using bulldozer); United States v. Pozsgai, 897 F.2d 524 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 812 (1990) (upholding felony Clean Water Act penalties for illegal
wetlands filling by individual using bulldozer).
... Moreover, the 1988 amendments to the Clean Water Act provide that for
certain types of discharges, including discharges of "medical waste," the statute
does not require that the discharge be from a point source for the Act's enforce-
ment provisions to apply. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(f) (1988). That provision could not be
used for the Plaza Health prosecution, however, because the dumpings pre-dated
the amendment.
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tems, render water unusable and jeopardize public health."6
Thus, while the "classic" point source discharge might be an in-
dustrial discharge of untreated waste waters into a river or
bay via a pipe, injury frequently results from other pollution
sources, including random dumpers.
Besides the distinction between industrial and non-indus-
trial waste, the other aspect of the Second Circuit's rul-
ing-that a person can never be a point source-creates anoth-
er gaping loophole for Clean Water Act enforcement. With this
further limitation on the Act's scope, even industries and mu-
nicipalities can avoid punishment under the Clean Water Act
for polluting our nation's waterways. Under the panel
majority's analysis, a company official wishing to save money
on waste disposal, yet also desiring to stay out of jail (and,
given the rule of lenity's equal application to civil enforcement,
to avoid a substantial civil penalty..), can now hire inexpen-
sive labor to transport the company's waste (industrial pollu-
tion) to the water's edge and hoist it into the water with their
hands without fear of prosecution under the Clean Water
Act.13
8
Under the majority's analysis, there are myriad acts that
could cause substantial pollution of our waters but which the
Second Circuit said the statute does not penalize-leaving
individuals largely free to use the nation's waters as a waste
receptacle. For example, homeowners can regularly dump their
household trash, worn furniture or any other unwanted items
in the Hudson River by any means without fear of federal
liability. Car owners can dump old car batteries (or whole cars)
in the river without concern. Business and industrial estab-
lishments need no longer expend money for a private carting
service to collect their refuse because, if they so choose, they
can take their garbage to the water's edge and heave it in by
hand.13 9
... See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79, 88 (2d Cir.
1975) ("As was recognized by Congress . . . a good deal of our present air and
water pollution has resulted from the accumulation of small amounts of pollutants
added to the air and water by a great number of individual, unrelated sources.").
137 See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
13 See Plaza Health, 3 F.3d at 654.
139 For all examples of non-industrial dumpers, of course, it would not matter
under the Second Circuit's analysis whether the dumpings were accomplished ulti-
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But how far does this ruling extend? Would the court find
a Clean Water Act violation if the employee of an industrial
business first put the pollutants in a bucket (a container),
walked to the river's edge and emptied the contents of the
bucket into the water? If the employee used a shovel to
transfer the pollutants to the water, would the Clean Water
Act be violated? What if, instead of putting the company's
waste vials in the trunk of a car and dumping it directly from
the trunk into the water with the use of his hands, the employ-
ee instead put them in a dump truck, backed the truck to the
river's edge and used his hand to press the lever to operate the
dump truck so that its contents poured into the water?
We now know that, at least in the civil context, the Second
Circuit considers "liquid-manure-spreading vehicles" to be
point sources. 40 Assuming the panel majority had considered
Villegas's dumping to be an industrial discharge, as the dissent
did, would the majority then have distinguished Villegas's
activities and found the Clean Water Act unambiguous as
applied to his conduct had Villegas rented a dump truck to
dump the vials instead of using his car?
The answers to these questions, especially for wetlands
enforcement,' are critical to understanding the extent to
which polluters can avoid responsibility for polluting the
nation's waterways. Indeed, as these few examples illustrate,
the panel majority analysis leaves it unclear when, if ever, the
intercession of a human hand in the dumping process will fail
as a defense to charges under the Act.
Another critical question raised by the Plaza Health deci-
sion is how it will impact civil enforcement of the Clean Water
Act. To what extent will the industrial/municipal requirement
be applied to civil enforcement cases involving non-industrial
or non-municipal pollution sources? Will the Second Circuit
apply the rule of lenity to interpret the term "point source"
mately by the human hand or by a statutory-listed point source because the
dumpings are non-industrial.
14 See Concerned Area Residents for the Env't v. Southview Farm, No. 93-9229,
1994 WL 480646 (2d Cir. Sept. 2, 1994). Moreover, many courts have held that
bulldozers, backhoes and dump trucks are point sources. See supra note 65.
141 As explained above, wetlands enforcement is typically against individuals,
and the means by which individuals fill in wetlands are bulldozers, backhoes,
dumptrucks and shovels.
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narrowly in future civil Clean Water Act cases?"
Certainly, a valid defense to a civil action brought against
a non-industrial, non-municipal polluter, or to a civil action
seeking to give an expansive meaning to the term "point
source," would be that civil and criminal Clean Water Act
enforcement cases must be treated alike since the same statu-
tory terms apply to both types of cases. The rule established by
the Supreme Court, and previously adopted in the Second
Circuit, mandates that the statute be applied consistently in
both civil and criminal enforcement contexts and that the term
"point source" be construed the same regardless of the civil or
criminal nature of the case.' Thus, because in Plaza Health
the Second Circuit has limited the Clean Water Act to prosecu-
tions for industrial and municipal pollution and has interpret-
ed the meaning of the term "point source" narrowly, it unfortu-
nately follows that these same principles must be applied to
future Clean Water Act civil enforcement cases.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the Second Circuit has in effect granted a license
to the "random" dumper who decides to use the nation's waters
as a refuse receptacle for chemicals, toxins or simple household
garbage, and to industrial and municipal dumpers as well if
they avoid using pipes or other "typical" point source convey-
ances to dump their wastes into the water. There is, however,
no legislative support for these "licenses" because there is no
de minimis exception to the Clean Water Act's enforcement
provision; nor is there any provision that permits deliberate
dumping of pollutants into the water in circumstances when
the human hand is ultimately responsible for the dumping.
The majority's holding essentially rewrites the Clean Water
Act to limit its coverage to a very small subset of water pollu-
tion. Unless and until the Second Circuit corrects the multiple
errors in Plaza Health, the future of Clean Water Act en-
14 This question has been answered in part by a recent decision of the Second
Circuit authored by Judge Oakes in which the court held that a vehicle is a point
source under the Act. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. Moreover, just
two years before Plaza Health, the court held that the term "point source" should
be interpreted broadly. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
4 See supra text accompanying notes 116-17.
1994]
724 BROOKLYNLAWREVIEW [Vol. 60: 689
forcement will remain as murky as our waters may become
courtesy of that decision.
